The wikipedia article on "revolutionary wave" includes the Revolution of 1848, the post WWI and WWII revolutions in Europe and its former colonies, as well as the colored revolutions of the last decade as its foremost examples. At the end of the article; however, the wave of unrest sweeping across the Middle East is also mentioned. No doubt, in my mind, will this year's events be considered a "revolutionary wave" in their own right, with regimes in three countries replaced and perhaps more along the way. 2011 is definitely a watershed year for the Arab World, and will perhaps be as significant for the region as the post-bellum revolutions were for Europe. Here are some of my thoughts on the 2011 Arab Revolutions compared to historical revolutionary movements, and some generalizing predictions on future developments.
First of all, its interesting to note that, as far as we know, this year's events have been largely spontaneous and initiated at the grass-roots level. Massive protests and uprisings across the Maghreb have largely caught traditional opposition by surprise, and to an extent have left them out in the cold. This is definitely true in Egypt and Libya, and if we look at the protests in Oman, Yemen, and perhaps Iran, what has pushed the common populace unto the streets was not incitation by a revolutionary elite, but a frustration at the lack of (mostly) economic opportunities and upward social mobility. (Self-Immolation was what started the protests in Tunisia)
This is both unlike 1848, when the revolutions were largely led by liberals and nationalists who sought to guide the mass movement, and in the 1905-1911 revolutions, when professional revolutionaries pushed through the downfall of the regime ancien in Russia, China, and elsewhere. 2011 shadows 1968 in many respects, except that it involved far more than the student population.
Of course, I'm only generalizing here. Libya consists of a deep running set of tribal networks and affiliations, while the Wahabist Muslim Brotherhood will no doubt have a role in the coming years in Egypt. But what I think its fascinating is that the revolutions do not have a definite leader, nor do they espouse a particular ideology, and as a result and to an extent, these revolutionary movements will evolve and adapt to fit the needs and common moods of the population in general.
I think 2011 will be a year of politicization for the emerging Arab youths. Just as 2008 was such a year of realization for many young nationalist Chinese, and to a less extent the election of Obama for many young Americans, so I think young Arabs will strive to play a more active role in the process of political decision-making and be much more visible in making their concerns and needs known.
In the short term, the prospects are rather bleak. A large part behind the reason why Arabs took to the streets was economic stagnation, and democratic elections do not produce economic miracles--a large and educated work force, stability, infrastructure, and cheap labor does. Unfortunately, I do not think the Arab nations to be in such a position. The fact that the revolutionary movements lacked a clear leader also means that whatever government that comes to power will be weak, following long periods of centralized power under authoritarian leaders, we are most likely to see a decentralized government and to an extent incapacity and frustration.
A relatively short period of anarchy will be followed by weak democratic governments, (I don't think that a Napoleon, Mao, or Ataturk could come to power in the M.E, although it is certainly a possibility if chaos and anarchy ensues) In the French Revolution and the Chinese Revolution, more than a decade of instability ensued before a strong man emerged, riding on the promise of stability for a weary and fearful people. But given how vocal the Arab population has been about democracy and government accountability, and the importance of the region's stability to the international order, I doubt that the G20 would allow anything to happen to the region that would lead to the return of an authoritarian leader.
Economic stagnation is still likely, at least on a whole, but we will see greater centripetal forces which will draw the Arab countries closer to each other.
Economic stagnation is still likely, at least on a whole, but we will see greater centripetal forces which will draw the Arab countries closer to each other.
- Greater sense of common identity among the Arab nations.
Socially, I think we will see a gradual crystallization of the Arab identity, especially among its exploding youth population.The youths/population at large will face the same challenges, unemployment; have similar experiences in the Revolutions of 2011, have similar outlooks (e.g. a distrust of Islamic fundamentalism and Western Powers), and I wouldn't be surprised if we see a growing sense of Arab identity in the coming years.
2. More presence of Western Powers and BRIC Nations.
An interesting development with respects to China is that the PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy) had sent a missile frigate to Libya to facilitate the evacuation of Chinese workers. This is important to note as it was only 2 years ago that the PLAN had sent its first task force to the Gulf of Aden on the pirate hunt, which in itself marked the first time since the 1300s that a Chinese naval force has embarked on a expedition to international waters. I would definitely say that the developments are happening all very fast. China had 30,000 employees in Libya, while the EU had 10,000. No doubt, most of these people will be back, as petroleum is just way too valuable an asset. But what I think will happen in the next few years will be an increased presence of great powers in the Middle East, not militarily, but NGOs and oil companies and construction firms and such. The fact that the fledgling government is weak would also leave vacuums which int' actors would strive to fill.
Now developed nations and China have a fine line to walk. There is a traditional sense of distrust towards western powers given the history of colonialism. The belief that the Europeans and Americans are out to steal our oil is also quite prevalent, I believe. Further, as a people the Arabs are fiercely proud, and would probably take offense at what they perceive as exploitation. China, on the other hand, does not have a history of colonialism, and it must not alienate an already uneasy population. China's economic policy has been based on cooperation with the status quo, now that the governments have been replaced, it would be interesting to see what Beijing would do if the new regimes prove unable, or unwilling to protect its interests. Discretion, as someone once said, is the better part of valor, especially when it comes to international politics.
3. Lastly, I am of the belief that the Maghreb nations would come closer as a result, and what we are potentially witnessing could be the Second Wave of Arab Nationalism, to make sure that its a liberal strand should be a high priority for the EU and the US.
